Catchwords like "modernisation" and "bureaucracy reduction" characterised the administrative policy debate in the 1990s. Opposition proceedings also came under fire in this context. They were deemed to lack the necessary system consistency, to be inconvenient in terms of political control, and to inadequately fulfil their functions in any case. Efforts to abolish them, based on this criticism, led to a patchwork of federal regulations concerning administrative opposition proceedings. In some federal states (Länder), these opposition proceedings were completely abolished, while in others they were – with a few exceptions – retained in their entirety. Many Länder have steered a middle course.
Legal protection in social law, too, is traditionally guaranteed not only by the courts but also within the administration in the form of opposition proceedings. These are of immense socio-political importance. Every year, some 2.2 million appeals are recorded centrally for statistical purposes. As a rule, legal recourse to the social courts is only possible if an appeal has been lodged prior to taking legal action. Objection proceedings are intended to provide legal protection, serve in terms of self-regulation, and aim at relieving the burden on the courts, thereby focusing simultaneously on those seeking legal protection, the executive and the judiciary.
But can the ideal and reality be reconciled? This dissertation is dedicated to the perspective of objectors to proceedings. On the basis of a survey of objectors at Deutsche Rentenversicherung Bund, the functions of the objection proceedings that are directed at the objectors have been analysed.
However, the results of the investigation at Deutsche Rentenversicherung Bund show a disparate picture overall. While the courts are likely to be relieved, at least in part, due to the high rate of redress, they are not sufficiently relieved by opposition proceedings with a view to acceptance. Those who accepted the decision, however, reported this as an important reason not to take legal action. The appeals committees deployed in social insurance matters also do not appear to play a significant role in the acceptance of decisions. A large proportion of respondents were not even aware of the existence of appeals committees.
Overall, about a quarter of unsuccessful appellants went to court. Chief reasons for the decision not to take legal action were alleged obstacles such as duration, costs and efforts required. Resignation and fears of difficulties also deterred many opponents from taking legal action. Disability pension proceedings played a special role. Opponents found these proceedings less fair, accepted them less often and lodged claims more often.
The main determinant for the acceptance of a decision was trust in the institution of Deutsche Rentenversicherung Bund and the extent of their own influence on the proceedings as perceived by the objectors. Those who felt that they were heard and taken seriously also had a positive attitude towards the result. In contrast, contact with assessors had little influence, although this was often felt to be insufficient.
Opposition proceedings are largely able to fulfil their legal protection function. The vast majority of respondents considered the thresholds involved in this context to be much lower than for court procedures. Accordingly, considerably more opponents had representatives act on their behalf in court than in opposition proceedings.
From the point of view of the respondents, opposition proceedings thus offer the opportunity to pursue one’s own interests independently without any major financial burden. At the same time, however, the procedure could be structured more profitably for those seeking legal protection, as well as the administration and courts. The provision of internal legal protection, designed as a fair and goal-oriented control instrument, is therefore justified in a modern administrative state.
