The Welfare State as an Integral Part of a Just Social Order
As part of the lecture series ‘Ethical and Religious Foundations of the Welfare State’, the lecture on 21 April 2026 addressed the question of how modern welfare states could be philosophically informed and what role the concept of the common good could play in this. The Max Planck Institute for Social Law and Social Policy welcomed as its guest speaker Prof. Dr Helen Alford, President of the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences in Rome and one of the leading figures in contemporary Catholic social thought.
The starting point for her reflections was the diagnosis that Western societies were currently in a state of crisis: the social fabric, Alford argued, referring among others to Adrian Pabst, was increasingly beginning to disintegrate. Despite isolated positive developments, such as higher levels of educational attainment or falling crime rates, there were signs of profound social erosion. These included declining trust in democratic institutions, social insecurity, loneliness, political alienation and the rise of authoritarian or populist movements.
Alford interpreted these developments as the consequence of an intensification of liberal ways of thinking. Over the course of the 20th century, she argued, classical liberalism had increasingly been distorted into an ideology of radical individualism. Whilst individual autonomy and the free exercise of will had been elevated to the highest standard, community-based obligations and forms of social solidarity had lost their significance. This had led to the weakening of social bonds and the destabilisation of the democratic community. Whilst modern society was able to organise shared instrumental goods – such as infrastructure, markets or legal systems – it was barely capable any longer of formulating shared intrinsic values that bind people together and give meaning to their coexistence.
The Common Good in the Social Ethics of Arthur Fridolin Utz
Alford sees a suitable approach to overcoming this crisis in the political philosophy of Arthur Fridolin Utz (1908–2001), who sought to enable the pluralistic society to reach a rational consensus on the values fundamental to it. For, as had also been acknowledged in the 2004 Munich Dialogue between Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger, the aim was to use the tools of rational discourse to identify those values that liberal-democratic societies required for their very foundation and future viability. A central principle was of decisive importance in Utz’s social ethics, namely the common good. This was not to be understood as the mere sum of individual interests, but as that good which perfected human beings precisely through their shared community.
Thus, in Utz’s view, the conceptual configuration of the welfare state was not primarily based on individual rights or contractual arrangements, but on an anthropologically grounded theory of the common good. This was based on a theory of knowledge that takes human nature and the incorporation of mankind in a communal order as its starting point, rather than focusing on autonomous individuals and their preferences. Accordingly, the economy and politics should not be understood as purely technical systems, but as components of a comprehensive social order oriented towards shared values, Alford explained.
In her presentation, Alford particularly highlighted Utz’s three-tiered analysis of the economic order. At the first level, Utz formulates general ethical norms that arise from human nature. The central question here is what purpose the economy as a whole should serve. The answer is: the material well-being of all members of society, whilst taking into account the natural foundations of human life. Economic activity must therefore always be sustainable and inclusive. An economic order that excludes large sections of the population or causes ecological destruction is regarded as irrational in this understanding.
At the second level, Utz takes into account the concrete historical reality of human beings, with their interests, weaknesses and conflicts. Here, he acknowledges that modern societies would be unable to function without private property and market-based mechanisms. People act economically primarily out of self-interest; an economic system must therefore institutionally incorporate this motive. Nevertheless, the common good remains the normative priority. Private property is therefore not absolute in nature, but is understood as a secondary natural right that serves the realisation of the common good. This provides the basis for social obligations such as the redistribution of resources.
Economic Growth Must Not Be an End in Itself
It is precisely at this point that the theoretical foundation of the welfare state becomes apparent. In Utz’s view, the latter does not appear as a post hoc correction to an autonomous market, but as an integral part of a just economic order. Social benefits serve to enable all members of society to share the material goods of the community. Alford emphasised in particular Utz’s call for a ‘second distribution of income’ for those people who are unable to participate directly in the economic process, such as the sick, the elderly or other vulnerable groups. Social policy was thus derived directly from the principle of the common good.
Equally central was the call for the broadest possible participation of all people in economic life. For Utz, work has not only economic import, but also social and personal significance. A just economic order must therefore strive for full employment and the broad distribution of productive property. Economic growth must not be an end in itself, but must be guided by social and environmental objectives.
Alford linked these considerations to fundamental criticism of a purely technocratic perspective in modern democracies. Social problems could not be solved through technical control or economic rationality alone. Rather, what was needed was a shared understanding of common values and goals. In this sense, she interpreted Utz as a pioneer of a social order that sought to preserve the achievements of individual freedom and social plurality, whilst at the same time placing greater emphasis on the social dimension of human existence.
The Necessity of Shared Values
At the end of her lecture, Alford drew on the reflections of Prof. Hans F. Zacher (1928–2015), the founding director of the Max Planck Institute for Social Law and Social Policy, who had also been a member of the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences and who, in that capacity, had engaged intensively with issues of intergenerational justice. In particular, Zacher critically analysed the concept of the ‘intergenerational contract’ and described it as ultimately illusory. The notion of a quasi-contractual balance between younger, working and older generations appeared increasingly questionable in the light of social changes, particularly demographic change and the pressures of the globalised world of work. According to Zacher, the traditional model of the intergenerational contract had imploded because its social preconditions no longer existed. The idea of ‘intergenerational justice’ therefore had to replace this supposed contract. This no longer aimed at an automatic mechanism within welfare state systems, but rather at a politically and ethically grounded responsibility towards all generations.
Alford saw a parallel here with Utz’s concept of the common good. Both Utz and Zacher argued against a purely functionalist or contractual view of social order. Instead, both emphasised the need for shared values that had to be rationally negotiated and that provided a normative guide for political and economic action. Consequently, the welfare state was not to be viewed merely as a technical safety net, but rather as an expression of a political community based on solidarity that consciously assumes responsibility for its members.
Overall, in her lecture and the subsequent discussion, Prof. Alford argued for a fundamental reorientation of thinking about the welfare state. In the face of social fragmentation, growing uncertainty and threats to democracy, the welfare state had once again to be grounded more firmly in the common good. If shared values formed the rational basis of social coexistence, they could strengthen social cohesion, stabilise democracy and promote the sustainability of modern welfare states.